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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRENT WHEELER, A Minor 
by Arlene Turley, His 
Guardian Ad Litern, and 
ARLENE TURJLEY, 
Plaintiffs-Respondenti:i, 
vs. 
DENNIS C. JONES and 
CHARLES R. JONE8, dba 
SUNPLAY POOL AND 
GARDEN CENTER, 
Defendants-Appellantl:i. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Plaintiff Brent Wheeler, a 12-year old boy, brought 
suit against appellants for personal injuries he sustained 
when he left appellants' swimming pool, as a business 
invitee, and walked through a sliding glass door used 
by appellants as an exit in the building located adjacent 
to the swimming pool which was used for selling garden 
and swimming supplies and for selling candy and con-
fections to the children swimming in the pool. Plaintiff 
Arlene Turley, as the natural mother of plaintiff Brent 
\Vheeler, sought damages for medical expenses incurred 
on behalf of her injured son. 
DISPOSITION IN LOvVER COURT 
The case was tried before a jury on December 16, 
19G5, with the Honorable J olm F. vVahlc1uist presidjng. 
The matter was submitted to the jury on special inter-
rogatories and the jury found that appellants were negli-
gent in maintaining a glass of a thickness or type in the 
slidjng door in question insufficient to withstand ordin-
ary bmnping without breaking or which would remain 
intact after breaking. Plaintiff Arlene Turley was award-
ed $1,578.75, and plaintiff Brent vVheeler was awarded 
the sum of $10,000.00. A motion for a new trial was de-
nied conditionally upon the condition that respondents 
accept a 5% reduction of the $10,000.00 mvarded to plain-
tiff Brent Viheeler. The respondents accepted the re-
duction and appellants appealed from the judgment of 
the court entered on the verdict. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmation of the jury verdict 
and the judgment entered theron by the court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents basically agree with appellants' state-
ment of facts except for the matters hereinafter set forth. 
At page 3 of appellants' brief it is noted that only 12 
children use the pool at any one time. It should further 
be noted that 36 children a day swam in the pool from 
ages 4 to 15 years and that the pool was used almost 
exclusively by children and not adults (T-131, 98). 
At page 4 of appellants' brief it is stated that when 
Brent vVheeler ente1·ed the building to observe the time, 
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he observed the door had been closed vart way. This 
statement obviously referred to his knowledge after the 
accident since he did not have a vivid recollection of the 
lJosition of the glass sliding doo1· prjor to the accident as 
the following testimony indicates ( T-193) : 
"Q. What did you see when you looked at the 
door~ 
"A. On the way in, or on tl1e "·ay out. 
"Q. \Vhen you looked on the two times on the 
way in, what did you see? 
"A. Nothing." 
In connection vvith whether or not there was a decal 
on the door in question as discussed by appellants on page 
7 of their brief, it should be noted that the mvner, Charles 
R. Jones, testified that he had no recollection of what 
the door looked like on the day of the accident (T-135). 
The other appellant, Dennis Jones, was in Chicago, Illin-
ois, at the time of the accident and had been there for 
two -..veeks and had no knowledge of what the door looked 
like at the time of the accident ('T-141, 144). The witness, 
Dennis Ball, testified that he couldn'~ remember whether 
there was a decal on the dooi' at the time of the accident 
and didn't recall picking up a decal when cleaning up 
after the accident (T-150, 153). The witness, James 
Hill, testified that he could not specifically remember 
seeing any decals or posters on the glass door prior to 
the accident except that when he was deaning up the 
glass after the accident he noticed something holding two 
pieces of glass together (T-176, 177). James Hill also 
testified that the glass that \Vas broken was the glass in 
the door that was located down around the knees and the 
feet ('T-178). The wife of one of the appellants, Leah 
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Jones, \Ya:m't at tlie pool at th<· tiuw of the aceidt•nt and 
had no knowle<leg·e of what th<' door looked like at the 
time of the aecident ( T-121). Brent Wheeler kstified 
that tlu•re was no d<·eal, poskr or other palJ<'r objL•ct 
on the glass at tlw tiuw of thL~ ac-cid<'nt (T-99). 
At page '/ of HlJlJdlants' brid it is stated that then' 
were water marks on the door whieh could be observed 
by a person looking through the door. Brent ~Wheeler 
kstified that on tlw day of the aceident tlw kids wen 
not diving or splashing arnund the door in question and 
that they were trying to stay in the pool and that he did 
not see any splash marks or any other visual marh 
on the door that <la;.' (T-191, 192). The witness Dennis 
Ball testified that thl'n~ was no sl't s<:hedule for the glass 
to lw cleaned but that it was cleaned when needed in 
order to keep it in a clean condition (T-153). The witness 
.James Hill testified that the glass was clraned regularly 
as needed to keep it clt>an hut that he didn't knmv when 
the last time it wa::-; deaned prior to the accident (T-175). 
\Vhen Brent \Vheeler arrived at the swimming pool 
he walked into the building and paid his .20¢ for two 
hours of swimming ( T-9-±). The sliding glass door \vas 
all the way optin at this time ( T-95). After swimming 
f tJl' ;.; pproximately an hcnr and a half he reentered the 
building to see what time it was ( T-95). After entering 
the building with his wristwatch in his hand, he reset 
his watch and turned around and looked through the 
door (T-9G). He was approximatel~, ten feet from the 
door at this time (T-97). He th('n looked down at his 
wristwateh and ::-;tarted walking towards the opening 
( T-97). At approximately four feet from the doorway 
he looked again through the doorway and testified that 
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the doorway looked like it had two upenings (T-9/'). lk 
then looked down at his wristwatch a second time and 
started walking towards the opening and struck the glas::; 
('l1-97). He was walking at the time with no lights on 
inside the building and with the weather in an overacst 
condition on the outside (T-98). There was no glare, no 
decal, no metal guard or divider, or glass ta1w on the door 
in question ( T-98, 99). 
Bert D. Vandenberg, manager of the gla::;s division 
of Bennett Glass and Paint in Ogden, testified that the 
glass in the door in question was the \Veakest glass put in 
doors of this type ( T-39, 40). He testified further that 
there were available three types of safety glass, i.e., glass 
,,·ith wire, laminated glass consisting of two pieces of 
glass with a plastic interlayer, and tempered glass which 
is lu~·at-treated and much stronger (T-40). He testified 
that these types of safety glass either resi::;t breaking 
or else hold together after breaking and don't produce 
sharp jagged edges (T-40). He further testified that he 
was familiar with the custom of schools, churches, and 
commercial establishments in the area and that it was the 
custom of schools to install tempered glass or glass with 
wire in it (T-42, 43). It was the custom for most churches 
in the area to use tempered glass in their doors (T'-44). 
He further testified that he knew of no l:usiness in the 
Ogden area that used sliding glass doors \\ith 3/lGths 
glass as exists (T-79). He further testified that FHA 
re<1uired either a bar in sliding glass doors of this type 
or else safety glass and that this requirement was in 
force at the time of the accident (T-44, 4-9). l\Ir. Van-
denberg further testified that the 95% of the place::; using 
3,- 16ths glass were residential and not commercial (T-79). 
5 
He th'n testifo·d that it was b0c0111ing quite generally 
knmn1 that sliding glass doors \n'n~ dangerous (T-52). 
As a l'l:'sult of the aC'cident, lfrent \Vheder suffered 
lH'l'lll<lll<'nt injur)· to his right wrist and hand causing 
a loss of sensation and a 13artial loss of function caused 
hy tPndons having lH_'<'n t-il'VPred ( T-5G, 57, 58). He suf-
fen_'d a large lacnation on his lPft forearm causing vis-
ible scarring (T-58, S9). The tendons were cut in his 
right ankle causing a partial lo:ss of function (T-59, GO). 
He had a lin1p, mid a daw deformity in his right hand 
( T-61, G3). And he further suffered a complete loss of 
the use of one al'te~·y in hi:s right hand together with a 
partial permanent loss of :sensation (T-G6, 67). 
ARGU:JIENT 
POINT I 
VvHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT BRENT WHEEL-
ER WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT WAS 
PROPERLY LEFT TO THE JURY. 
The north side of the building in question consisted 
of a stationary glass panel measuring 58 inches by 76 
inches and a sliding glass door locafrd directly west of 
the stationary panel measuring 58 inches by 76 inches 
consisting of 3/16tlrn sheet glass Cl1-37, 47). A slippery 
slid(~ was placed inside the building and was located so 
that it extended along the stationary glass panel ( T-140). 
Tht_• testimony was uncontraverted that Brent 'Wheeler 
was a 12-year old boy, had looked twice into the door 
opening within 10 feet of the :same, that he was walking 
and \\'US not running or t>ngaged in horseplay; and that 
iJ1erP was no metal bar, glass tape or safety glass in 
the door in question. Brent \Vheeler te:stified that there 
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was no decal or other posters on the glass in the door and 
all of appellants' witnesses, including hoth appellants, 
testified that they had no personal knowledge of what 
was on the door or what the door looked like at the time 
of the accident. The only testimony remotely inf erring 
a foreign object on the door was the testimonv of .James 
Hill in which he indicated that in cleaning up the glass 
he noticed something holding two pieces uf glass together 
hut ·which he could not indentify. 
\Vhen counsel for appellants indicates that the door 
was adequately marked in that the jury found that re-
spondents had failed to prove that there was no decal on 
the door, he misinterprets the inference. It seems clear 
that the jurors were in a state of uncertainty as to whe-
ther or not there was a decal since Brent ·wheeler had 
testified positively that there wasn't and the other wit-
nesses had testified that on other occasions prior to the 
accident they had noticed a decal. This state of uncer-
tainty is not a positive fact which appellants can use for 
the purpose of inferring that a decal was in fact on the 
door. There was not one witness who testified that there 
was a decal on the door at the time of the accident. 
Appellants contend that there were splash marks on 
the sliding door at the time of the accident. The evidence 
from the appellants' witnesses indicated that it was the 
custom for the doors to be kept clean and were cleaned 
when needed. The evidence also indicated that the child-
ren were not diving at the time of the accident but were 
mostl~r staying in the pool. In connection with the con-
dition of the glass at the time of the accident, it is sig-
nificant what Mr. Jones told the stepfather of Brent 
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\Vheeler the next day after the accident ( '1'-83) : 
"Q. Did you have occasion to go to the 8unplay 
Pool and Uarden Swiuuuing Fool the next 
day after the acei<lent and have a conversa-
tion with Mr. (.;harles Jones 1 
··A. Yes, I di<l. 
"Q. And will you tell us about what time of day 
it was and what was said? 
"A. ~Well, it was about 10 o'clock in the morning 
we went out to pick up Brent\; bike and his 
clothes. \Ve went up and introduced our-
selve.s as such and told him what we \Vere 
there for. lle asked about Brent, how he wa.:' 
doing, and through the course of the conver-
sation l\fr. J om•s stated that the Sunday 
prior to this happening which was on a 
\Vedne:,;;day, that his wife had spent some 
time cleaning this glass until it was spark-
ling clean. rrhere was no dust marks, finger 
prints or anything on the glas.s, and they had 
put the new glass in, and at this time he 
stated, and he put his Lig decal on there so 
no one would mistake this for an opening." 
It should further be noted that on the three prior 
occasions which Brent \Vheeler had been to the subject 
sw!r:m1ing pool, on all three occasions the sliding glass 
door was completely open ( T-98, 99). 
As to appellants' contention that Brent \Vheeler 
took a piece of candy und was engaged in an act of theft, 
it should be pointed out that this issue was not argued 
at the trial by counsel either in his opening statement or 
in his summation, and that the conclusion arrived at is 
unwarranted from the evidence. The n•cord clearly shows 
that the purpose for Brent entering the building was to 
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m;certain what fone it was for the purpo::;e of finding 
out how much time he had left to swim. 
It must be remembered that Brent Wheeler wa::; a 
12-year old child and comes under this court's holding 
in the case of Mann v. Fairbourn, 12 Utah 2d 342, 366 
P. 2d 603 wherein this court held that the degree of care 
required of a child must be graduated to its age, capacity 
and experience, and must be measured by what might 
ordinarily be expected from a child of like age, capacity 
and experience under similar conditions. 
In the case of 111 cCain v. Bankers Life atnd Casulty 
Cumpan:y, 110 SO. 2d 718, 68 A.L.R. 2d 1194 (Fla. App.), 
where an 8 year old boy and his mother were visiting and 
inspecting a model home with sliding glass doors separ-
ating a room from the back yard and where the boy had 
walked several times through the open glass doors and 
then walked into one of the glass panels in the closed 
door of the second model house, the court held that the 
question of negligence was for the jury and then made 
the following observation: 
"It takes more indication of danger to alert 
a child than to alert an adult. Children are neces-
sarily lacking in the knowledge of physical causes 
and effects which is usually acquired only through 
experience.'' 
1'he court further observed that those who invite children 
on their premises are required to exercise a higher degree 
of care for their safety than for adults. 
InCminer u. Blank, 152 So. 2d 193 (Fla. App. 1963), 
where· a 13-year-old girl had accompanied her parents 
on an inspection tour of defendant's model home and 
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where the child ran through the closed middle glass sec-
tion of a three panel sliding glass door immediately after 
she had previously ·walked through one of the panels of 
the door that was open, the court held that the issue of 
negligence was for the jury and the question of the con-
tributory negligence of a 13-year-old child was not even 
raised in the case. 
See the case of Harold Corporation 'C. Herzberg, 110 
So. 2d 683 (Fla. App. 1939) where the court held that 
a hotel guest who walked into one of a E>eries of sliding 
glass panels screening a serving bar at the rear of the 
hotel was not guilty of contributory negligence. 
For a New York case involving a plaintiff who walk-
ed against the glass panel of a door in the lobby of a 
commercial building of defendant see Grable v. Hamdro 
Co. Inc., 161 N.Y.S. 2d 998 (1955), where the court held 
that whether or not the plaintiff was contributorily 
negligent 'lvas for the jury and made the observation that 
as plaintiff walked toward the glass panel doors he 
thought he was walking into space since the entire ar-
rangement gave the illusion of space. The court then 
made the following observation on page 999: 
''When the illusion is so successful that some 
hapless person is injured in mistaking the illusion 
for reality he can hardly be charged with contrib-
utory negligence as a matter of law." 
In Shamwn v. Bigelow-Sanford Carpet Company, Inc. 
96 G.A. App. 458, 100 S.E. 2d 478, where plaintiff while 
leaving offices of defendant were plaintiff had been trans-
acting business with defendant and when plaintiff's hand 
pressed against a glass panel alongside the door and the 
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panel fell out, the court reversed a judgment sustaining 
a general demurrer and held that it could not say as a 
matter of law that plaintiff in placing his hand on a glass 
panel was quilty of contributory negligence as would bar 
him from recovery; and the court further held that the 
negligence of the defendant was sufficiently set out to 
withstand a general demurrer. 
In the Pennsylvania case of Kanner v. Best Mar-
kets, Inc., 188 Pa. 366,, 147 A2d 172, where a patron sus-
tained injuries when he bumped his face against a clear 
glass panel as he attempted to enter the store through 
an unlighted door, the court affirmed a judgment for 
the plaintiff and then observed at page 174: 
"Defendant offered testimony to show that 
the construction of this exit conformed with the 
accepted design of stores of this type, all of which 
is not disputed. However, the invisibility of clear 
glass, by its very nature, deceives the most wary. 
Contsruction which places clear glass at walk 
level, at an entrance or exit of a heavily traversed 
building, without marking or adequate lighting, 
gives rise to the possibility of an accident of the 
very type which occurred in this case. As was 
noted in the opinion of the court below, 'the same 
combination of facts which justified the jury in 
finding the defendant negligent also justified them 
in finding the plaintiff not contributorily negli-
gent. For, if the cfrcumstances were such that 
plaintiff could have reasonably believed that he 
was about to walk through an opening, it cannot 
be said that, in so walking, he failed to act as a 
reasonably prudent man.'' 
In Eberle, Jr., v. Benedictine Sisters of Mt. Angel, 
385 P2d 765 (Oregon 1963) where a 13-year-old student 
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received a hand injury when he attempted to hold open a 
door and his hand :slipped off the bar, against a glass 
panel in the door and broke it, the court held that the 
question of whether use of double strength glass in the 
door instead of quarter inch plate glass, which according 
to the evidence was four times as strong as double 
strength glass, was negligence vrns for the jury and the 
question of the child's contributory negligence was not 
raised on the appeal. 
For other cases pertinent to the issue under discus-
sion see Shannon v. Broadiray & 41st Street Corporation, 
73 N.Y.S. 2d 711, 81 K.K 2d 324; Shipp v. Ciirtis, 318 F 
2d 797 (U.S.C.A. 9th Cir.); Sneed v. KFH Building, Inc., 
349 P. 2d 950 (Kansas 19GO); and Eggenschwiler v. Mid-
western Motor Lodge Corporation, 286 F. 2d 765 (U.S.-
C.A. 7th Cir. 1961). 
Based upon the evidence taken in a light most 
favorable to respondents and applied to the rules of law 
set forth in the aforementioned cases, it seems clear that 
the alleged contributory negligence of plaintiff Brent 
\Vheeler and the negligence of defendant are questions 
of fact for the jury and the judgment entered upon the 
jury verdict should be affirmed on these issues. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY SUBMITTED IN-
TERROGATORIES TO THE JURY WHICH WOULD 
ALLOW THE JURY TO FIND THAT APPELLANTS 
WERE NEGLIGENT IN MAINTAINING GLASS IN 
THE DOOR IN QUESTION OF A THICKNESS OR 
TYPE WHICH WAS INSUFFICIENT TO WITH-
STAND ORDINARY BUMPING WITHOUT BREAK-
12 
ING OR WHICH WOULD REl\IAIN INTACT AFTER 
BREAKING. 
The only expert \vitne88 profent>d h>· an>· of the 
parties on the issue of liability was Bert D. Vandenberg, 
:Manager of the glass division of Bennett Glass & Paint 
Company, of Ogden. His testimon>- of necessity must he 
examined carefully on the issue of liability. 
Appellants contend that there \vas no testimony on 
the "thiclmess issue'' of the glass in question. :Mr. \'an-
d en berg testified that 3/16 glass was the weakest glass 
put in doors of the size involved in this litigation (T-39, 
40.) He further testified that safety tempered glass 
ranged in thickness from 7 /32 on up to one full inch 
(T-47). He then testified that 3/16 glass had an aver-
age rupture force of 6,000 pounds per f'quare inch and 
tempered glass had an average rupture force of 30,000 
pounds per square inch (T-48). He further testified that 
tempered glass is much stronger and that it takes much 
greater force to break it and when it does break it crystal-
lizes into very small particles about a quarter inch in 
diameter that are completely harmless as far as cutting 
is concerned (T-40, 41). 
Mr. Vandenberg then testified that the glass with 
wire in it and the laminated glass consisting of two sheets 
of glass with a plastic interlayer would both break with 
ariproximately the same force a8 the 3/16 sheet glass 
but that the t,1,-0 types of safety glass would not shatter 
and would thereby eliminate the dangerous sharp edges 
which the 3116 would have when it 8hatters (T-40). 
I 
This testimony related to the allegation that the appel-
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lants were negligent in not maintaining glns:s which would 
remain intact after breaking. 
Appellants' counsel consistently reforn to l\Ir. Van-
denberg'::; testimony that 95% of the glas:s installed in 
the community was :3/16 but fails to cite the balance 
of Mr. Vandenberg's testimony in which he indicates that 
local schools, churches, antl commercial buildings do not 
use 3/lG glas:s iD :sliding- gfa:ss doorn used as exits 
and that this \ras :so without exce1Jtion to his knowledge. 
rrhe installation of 3/1() glas:s in the area wa:s confined 
to residential use. In this connection he testified that the 
FHA standards existint; at the time of the accident re-
quired either a metal bai' 01· safety glass and that it was 
becoming quite well known that sliding glass doors were 
dangerous. 
It should b~ noted that approximately 36 children 
from agPs 4: to 15 frequented the swimming pool each 
day. It can be assumed that the appellants were familiar 
with the activities of small children in and about a swim-
ming pool and \\·ere aware that the children would be 
entering the building in question since they did so to pay 
their entrance fee and also for candy. 
It is a well known legal principle that inasmuch as 
the amount of caution used by the ordinary prudent per-
:son varies in direct proportion to the danger known to 
be involved in his undertaking, it follows that in the 
exercise of ordinary care, the amount of caution re-
quired will vary in accordance wit hthe nature of the act 
and the surrounding circumstances. See Klenk v. Oregon 
Shortli11e R.R. Co., 27 Utah 4:28, 76 P. 214. 
This court has also held that ordinarily it is neces-
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sary to l'Xerc1se greater caution for the protection and 
:-:afety of a young child than for an adult iwrson. One 
dvaling with children must anticipate the ordinary be-
havior of children. The fad that the)· usually cannot and 
do not exercise the same degree of prudence for their own 
safety as adults, that they often are thoughtless and im-
pulsive, imposes a duty to exercise a degree of vigilance 
and caution commensurate with such circumstances in 
dealing with children. See Kau;aguchi i:. Be111nett, 112 
l-tah -1-±2, 189 P.2d 109; and llerald i:. /:Jmith, 5G l~tah 
30±, 190 P. 932. 
1t should be nokd that a1ipdlants had what is termed 
a "blue ribbon jury" in that a number of the jurors "·ere 
business people and could reasonably identify themselves 
with the iwsition of the appellants. Juror Frank E. New-
rnan had managerial responsibility on safety problems 
,,-ith Gibbons & Reed Construetion Company (T-11, H). 
Juror l\Iilton \Vilcox owned and operated a grocery store 
and ·was responsible for the safety and operation of his 
business (T-11, 15). Juror Raymond Liptrot was a cash-
ier at the First Security Bank and was involved in deci-
:sions as to safety precautions and related matters (T-11, 
13). Juror Edward Blair owned and operated a service 
station as the sole proprietor (T-15, 16). Juror Clyde 
Hunter worked for Hilton and Can Construction Com-
1ian>· and it \Vas his responsibility to take care of the in-
surance claims and safety problems (T-12, 17). Juror 
Frank E. X ewman also had a personal knowledge of ap-
pt.>llants' premises since he did the paving there ( T-19). 
The jury was also an experienced jury having sat on 
numerous civil and criminal cases in the past ( T-22, 23). 
In weighing the jury's verdict, it should also be con-
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8idered that ]_'our of the jurorn had sliding glass doors in 
their residPnces and were familiar with the tonstruction 
and usage• of the same ( T-:2;3, 24-). 
In ±S A.L.R. :2d lU-l, it is stakd that the general rule 
as to the liability of a private uwner or operator of a 
bathing resort or a swm1111ing pool for injury or death of 
a i)atron is that the owner has a dutv to use ordinarv due .. .., ' ' 
or reasonabk· care for the safety of the patrons and tu 
provide patrons \\·ith a saie place and keep the premise~ 
in a n•ascmably safe condition; and that any appliance~ 
must lw reasonalJiy fit for tbe purpose for which they 
are used; but that thc- U\'.'lll'l' 1s not an insurer of the safe-
ty of the patron. 
It is evident that tlw jury togetlwr with the trial 
eourt, in applying the l'Yidc·nce to the lm,-, felt that the 
appellants had not acted in ateordance ·with this standard. 
POINT III 
THE JURY Vv AS PROPERLY INSTRUCTED AS TO 
THE APPLICABLE LAW GOVERNING THE CASE 
IN QUESTION. 
Respondents request this court to examine carefully 
the cases cited in respondents' brief herein under Point I 
fo1· Uh· reason that these cases discuss in detail the ques-
tions of negligence, contributory negligence and lookout 
as it relates to glass objects. 
rrhis tonrt is further n·ferred to the l'tah cases cited 
in the respondent's brief unde1· Point I as to the degree 
of care the law imposes on a 12-year-olcl child. 
Appellants complain that the court improperly in-
structed the jury on the issue of improper lookout and 
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that this prevented the jury from properly evaluating 
this phase of th0 la-wsnit. It shonld he nokd that appel-
lant's counsel both in his opening statement and in his 
argturn<'nt to the jur:,· cl<'::irl:· and forcefully presented 
the defense of contributory negligence hy Brent ·wheel-
er'::> alleged failure to keep a safe and proper lookout 
and it seems clear that the jury undersood appellant's 
position in this regard ( 'l1-34, 220). 
L~nder proposition No. 3 of the special verdict form 
th1· court asked the jury to determine whether Brent 
\Yht>eler was m•gligent in failing to maintain a reason-
abl1· lookout before proceeding through the space. Then 
directly under this the court asked the jury to determine 
\dwther Brent \Vheek•r 1rns negligent in failing to be 
reasonably attentive in passing through the door space 
in qm•stion. In proposition Ko.± of the special verdict the 
eourt r<::'peated these two propositions again as to proxi-
1aate cause. It would seem that the special verdict amply 
::wt forth appellants' position as to lookout. 
The court instructed on contributory negligence in 
Instructions No. 6, 11, 15 and 17, and it would seem that 
in view of counsel's statements, the court's instructions 
and the special verdict, that the jury was properly in-
:-;tructed and amply considered the issue of improper 
lookout. 
Appellants complain that the court commented on 
wattT b(_•ing in Brent \VhePler's eyes from swimming. It 
would seem that common sense would indicate this to the 
awragp individual in view of the fact that Brent \Vheeler 
had bePn swimming for approximately an hour and a half 
and had just left the pool to see what time it was. It is 
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difficult to see hmv appellanb find spec:ulation in the 
court's instructions since no instrudions were given as 
to the \Yater in Brent';:; eyes. 
It is submitted that the jury adet1uatdy con::;idered 
the ap1Jellants' position on failure to keep a safe and 
proper lookout and failed to find the same upon the 
grounds that Brent looked twice and didn't see the glass 
because of the "iliu::iion of ::;pace.'' 
POINT IV 
THE EVIDENCE ADl\lITTED AT THE Til\IE OF 
TRIAL WAS PROP}.;RLY RECEIVED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT. 
Appellants complain Uiat respondents' glas8 expert 
testified that the sliding glass doors were dangerous over 
appellants' objection that the answer was not responsive 
to the question. It \'.'ill be noted that this objection is only 
available to the party examining the witness and not a 
right of the party adverse to the examiner. In 58 Am. Jur. 
Sec. 575, at page 322, it states: 
"The right to have an irre::;ponsive answer 
of a \vitness stricken out is a right of the party ex-
amining the witness, and not a right of the party 
adverse to the examiner; if the answer of a wit-
ness is competent and pertinent in itself, the ad-
verse party has no right to have it expunged from 
the record merely because it is irresponsive; in 
such a case it is optional with the court to strike 
it out, and a denial of a motion to do so is no 
ground of error.'' 
In sf~ction 57G at the sauw page in the same volume, it is 
::;tated: 
"rrlw remedy where an irresponsive or im-
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proper answer is given to a proper question is a 
motion to strike out the answer; where the objec-
tion goes only to the responsiveness of the answer, 
and not to its general competency or admissibility, 
the motion to strike is open only to the party ask-
ing the question. l\loreover, it must be interposed 
in the trial court, and will not be considered where 
first urged on appeal." 
It will be noted that appellants' obj<:•ction did not go 
to the competency or admissibility of the answer but only 
to the fact that it was not responsive and the objection 
was therefore not well taken. 
In Souza v. Becker, 18 .N.E. 2d 350, 120 A.L.R. 1002 
: :Hasf'.), where in cross-examination a witness was asked 
whether or not he made a note of the condition of the 
windm\' where a pane of glass had fallen and injured a 
passerby, and where the witness testified that he had 
made a note of the condition of the window since it was 
in a very dangerous condition, the court held that the 
answer was responsive and the answer should stand. See 
also to this effect Quinn i·. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 
'.2-!-9 :Mass. 194, 144 N.E. 53; DiRienz.o v. Goldfarb, 257 
Mass. 272, 153 N.E. 784. 
For numerous cases where expert testimony has been 
allowed to show hazardous and dangerous conditions in 
buildings see 62 A.L.R. 2d 1451 in particular and the 
\rhole annotation in general. 
The cases hold that safety codes are admissible as ob-
jectivt> standards especially in association with and in 
support of expert testimony to illustrate safety practices 
prt>vailing in the industry. 
In lllcComish v. De8oi, 42 N.J. 274, 200 A.2d 116, the 
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court held that the use of a safety code related to the con-
struction industry and by various services of the armed 
forces were admissjble as objective standards especially 
in association with expert testimony to illustrate safety 
practices prevailing in the industry. 
In Sage v. Northern Pacific B. Co. 380 P.2d 85G 
( vV ash.), the court held that a booklet issued by the Na-
tional Safety Counctl ,.,-as properly introduced into evi-
dence in connection with admission of testimony of one 
of plaintiff's expert witnesses concerning safety stand-
ards relating to the carriage of loose equipment in ve-
hicles. 
In H crculcs Po1l'dcr Co. i-. DiSalHdino, 188 A.2d 529 
(Del.), the court held that safety codes prepared and is-
sued by government agencies are not admissible as inde-
pendent evidence to prove truth of statements or stand-
ards contained in them but it is permissjble to ask an ex-
pert witness on direct as well as on cross-examination to 
state grounds of his opinion and to detail general data on 
which his opinion is based. 
At page 41 of appellant's brief, appellants cite the 
majority rule in connection with safety codes as stated 
in 73 A.L.R 2d 780. However, the following state-
ment at page 781 of this annotation is elucidating: 
''In view of the general, long term trend to-
ward greater liberality in the statement or inter-
pretation of the rules respecting the kinds of rele-
vant information which may be presented to the 
trier of foct, it is further suggested that appealing 
parties who have not been permitted to introduce 
such evidence might well seek to have the rule judj- ' 
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cially stated or restated to allow relevant code::; or 
standards issued by governmental divisions to be 
admitted in evidence, not as absolute standards 
having the force of law, which they admittedly are 
not, nor as scientific truth, but at least for pur-
po::ies of comparison, illustration, and elucidation, 
in connection with other opinion testimony, the 
conditions of, and the safeguards surrounding, the 
admission to be left to the '.vise discretion of the 
trial judge, combined possibly with a requisite 
that the• particular code or standard to be identi-
fied, and its value among experts be described, by 
an expert witness.'' 
Tlw Trial Court's Memorandum reflects the court's 
,-iew in this connection as follows (R-17): 
"The authorities appear to be divided as to 
whether or not the specific standards of govern-
ment agencies, school boards, or large church 
groups are admissible as evidence of the general 
standard of the community, or as evidence of gen-
eral community recognition of danger inherent 
in sliding glass doors. 
"Some authorities say that such evidence is 
admissible only in explanation of an expert's opin-
ion that such doors are dangerous. The court here 
believes that the better reasoned decisions are that 
such evidence should be receivable as having a 
direct bearing on the issue of whether or not such 
doors are recognized as dangerous, and, therefore, 
denies the motion for new trial on this basis." 
It can hardly be stated that appellants were preju-
<lieed by this testimon~' regarding FHA standards since 
the testimony was given by an expert in the glass industry 
an<l it was supportive of the expert's testimony that 
3/16' glass was not used for exits in local schools, 
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churches, and commercial establislnnents \vhere young 
children are likely to be found. 
Appellants complain that respondents' glass expert 
was allowed to testify as to local custom in the schools, 
churches and commercial buildings. The general rule in ' 
this connection, is stated in 137 A.L.R. 611 as follows: 
"As to usages or customs of persons generally, 
or of those engaged in a particular sort of business 
or occupation, the doctrine almost invariably up-
held is that where reasonable minds may differ as · 
to the question of negligence, proof of an existing 
general usage tonforming to or differing from the 
practice followed by the defendant may properly 
be admitted in evidence for what it is worth." 
In Brigham Young University v. Lillywhite, 118 F.2d 
836, 137 A.L.R. 598, \Yhere a student at the Brigham 
Young University was injured in an explosion in a 
chemical laboratory experiment and where expert testi-
mony was allowed to establish the method and manner 
employed in conducting chemistry classes at other insti-
tutions in the vicinity, the court held that the evidence 
as to precautions taken by others to avoid the infliction 
of injury under the same or similar circumstances, while 
incompetent to establish a stnadard of care, is admissible 
in a negligence action as bearing upon the question 
whether the conduct of the defendant evidenced due care 
or the lack of it. 
In 20 A.L.R. 2d 95 at pages 97 and 98, involving 
the question of the liability of a store owner for an injury 
to a customer by falling display objects, it is stated as 
follows: 
"In order to determine whether the storekeep-
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er has exercised due care, it has been held that evi-
dence of the custom of others in the vicinity in 
storing or displaying similar merchandise may be 
shown, and that evidence of simialr accidents on 
other occasions may also be relevant.'' 
In the Utah case of De Weese v. J. C. Penney Co., 5 
Litah 2d 116, 297 P.2d 898, involving an action against a 
store owner for injuries sustained by a customer when she 
fell jn the entrance of the store, this court held that testi-
mony as to customs and practices of others similarly situ-
ated was properly admitted as bearing upon the issue of 
what ordinary and reasonable care for the defendant was 
under the circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
It is evident from the foregoing facts and legal au-
thorities that appellants had their day in court and that 
the jurors and the trial judge properly performed their 
respective functions. 
It is respectfully submitted that the verdict and the 
court's judgment thereon be affirmed. 
Respecfully submitted, 
FROERER, HORO\VITZ,PARKER 
RICHARDS, THOR.l\LEY & 
CRITiCHLo-w 
By--------------------------------------------------------------
Richard H. Thornley 
Attorneys for Respondents 
200 Kiesel Building 
Ogden, Utah 
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